

PATRONAGE & CORRUPTION

POL 4810
Fall 2013
MW 1:00-2.15
Office: Social Sciences 1383
Office Hours: TBD

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Course Description

This course examines dysfunction within the state apparatus – in the specific forms of patronage, corruption, and clientalism – and asks why such dysfunction persists and what factors drive it to change. The first half of the course will be primarily devoted to patronage. It will examine the functioning of the patronage mechanism; ask when and why patronage is abandoned in favor of meritocracy; and will assess the relationship between merit reforms and changes in the quality of governance. The second half of the course will be devoted to corruption. Specific topics to be covered will include: an examination of different forms of corruption, both at the level of political leaders and of bureaucratic officials; the relationship between corruption, democracy, transparency and accountability; governments' manipulation of corruption to provide incentives to bureaucratic and party officials; and different means of combating corruption. The course will conclude with an examination of the relationship between patronage, corruption, clientalism and party politics, with a particular focus on the mechanisms that cause the correlation between these different forms of mis-governance.

Assignments

Students will be asked to complete four 2-3 page response papers based on the week's readings. These response papers should critically discuss the readings – and may be addressed either to specific books or papers or to common issues raised by two or more readings. Alternatively, students may suggest applications of theories advanced in the week's readings, or may deduce further implications of these theories. **Response papers should *not* merely summarize the arguments advanced in the readings.** Responses should be submitted one day prior to class and will serve as a starting point for discussion during class meetings.

Students will additionally be asked to complete a 10-15 page final paper. This paper may be a literature review pertaining to topics raised during class, a public policy paper, or an outline of an original research proposal.

- Research proposals should clearly state the question of theoretical interest, outline the research hypothesis, and detail the methods that would be used to test this hypothesis. Students must indicate what data are available to test this hypothesis or how such data would be collected. However, a complete empirical analysis is *not* required.
- Literature reviews should critically engage a literature beyond the readings provided in class. The purpose of the literature review is *not* simply to recapitulate existing research findings, but rather to develop a broader analytical frame into which these findings can be placed. Literature reviews should

therefore advance a clear argument, and should carry clear implications either for the direction of future research or for public policy.

- Public policy proposals should focus on specific reforms that may be used to combat particular examples of corruption or patronage. The paper should discuss the nature and scope of the problem – relying on academic, policy, and/or journalistic sources – and should propose a feasible reform or series of reforms to deal with this problem. Students should draw on the academic literature covered in class to derive arguments about the likely effectiveness of proposed reforms, and challenges posed to such effectiveness. Alternatively, students may review existing proposed laws or institutions and discuss the likely impact of these reforms in light of existing academic work.

Grading

- **20 percent** of the final grade will be based on class participation.
- **40 percent** of the final grade will be based on evaluations of the four response papers and paper proposals/outlines.
- **40 percent** of the final grade will be based on the final paper.

Readings

September 4: Introduction

September 9: Defining Patronage and Corruption

Readings:

- Chapter 8, “Bureaucracy,” in H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, editors. *From Max Weber*. Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1970
- Herbert Kitschelt and Steven I. Wilkinson. *Patrons, Clients and Policies: Patterns of Democratic Accountability and Political Competition*, chapter Citizen-Politician Linkages: An Introduction, pages 1–49. Cambridge University Press, 2007

September 11: The Function and Logic of the ‘Spoils System’

Readings:

- Chapters 2 and 3 in Daniel P. Carpenter. *The Forging of Bureaucratic Autonomy: Reputations, Networks and Policy Innovations in Executive Agencies, 1862-1928*. Princeton University Press, 2001
- James A. Robinson and Thierry Verdier. The political economy of clientalism. July 2003

September 16: Patronage and ‘Bossism’ in City Politics

Readings:

- Chapters 9 and 10 in Edward C. Banfield and James Q. Wilson. *City Politics*. Harvard University Press, 1963
- Chapters 1 and 3 in Judith Chubb. *Patronage, Power and Poverty in Southern Italy: A Tale of Two Cities*. Cambridge Studies in Modern Political Economies. Cambridge University Press, 1982

September 18: Bossism Continued

In class viewing and discussion of *Street Fight* (2005)

Readings:

- Chapters 2-4 in Mike Royko. *Boss: Richard J. Daley of Chicago*. New American Library, 1971

September 23: The Spoils System in the Developing World

Readings:

- Chapters 1 and 2 in Barbara Geddes. *Politician's Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America*. University of California Press, 1994
- Lakshmi Iyer and Andandi Mani. Traveling agents: Political change and bureaucratic turnover in india. November 2009

September 25: Patronage in Non-Democracies

Readings:

- Report on the organization of the permanent civil service, 1854 <http://www.civilservant.org.uk/northcotetrevelyan.pdf>
- Chapter 5 in Jane Caplan. *Government without Administration: State and Civil Service in Weimar and Nazi Germany*. Clarendon Press, 1988

September 30: Patronage versus Meritocracy – Political Effects

Readings:

- Olle Folke, Shigeo Hirano, and James M. Snyder, Jr. Patronage and elections in u.s. states. *American Political Science Review*, 105(3):567–585, August 2011
- James E. Rauch. Bureaucracy, infrastructure, and economic growth: Evidence from u.s. cities during the progressive era. *The American Economic Review*, 85(4):968–979, September 1995

October 2: Patronage versus Meritocracy – Economic Effects

Readings:

- Peter Evans and James E. Rauch. Bureaucracy and growth: A cross-national analysis of the effects of “weberian” state structures on economic growth. *American Sociological Review*, 64(5):748–765, 1999
- James E. Rauch and Peter B. Evans. Bureaucratic structure and bureaucratic performance in less developed countries. *Journal of Public Economics*, 75:49–71, 2000
- Introduction to John Brewer. *The Sinews of Power*. Alfred A. Knopf, 1989

October 7: Reform of the Patronage System in the US

Readings:

- Introduction to Part II and Chapter 3 in Stephen Skowronek. *Building a New American State: The Expansion of National Administrative Capacities, 1877-1920*. Cambridge University Press, 1982
- Michael M. Ting, James M. Snyder, Jr., Shigeo Hirano, and Olle Folke. Elections and reform: The adoption of civil service systems in the u.s. states. *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, Forthcoming

October 9: Reform of the Patronage System Outside the US

Readings:

- Chapters 5-6 in Barbara Geddes. *Politician’s Dilemma: Building State Capacity in Latin America*. University of California Press, 1994
- James R. Hollyer. Merit recruitment in 19th and early 20th century european bureaucracies. April 2011

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October 14: Introduction and Measurement

Readings:

- Chapter 1 in Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel. *Economic Gangsters: Corruption, Violence, and the Poverty of Nations*. Princeton University Press, 2008
- Jakob Svensson. Eight questions about corruption. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 19(3):19–42, Summer 2005
- Daniel Treisman. What have we learned about the causes of corruption from ten years of cross-national empirical research? *Annual Review of Political Science*, 10:211–244, 2007

October 16: Corruption in Historical Perspective, the US

Readings:

- Introduction and Chapter 2 in Edward L. Glaeser and Claudia Goldin, editors. *Corruption and Reform: Lessons from America's Economic History*. The University of Chicago Press, 2006

October 21: 'Grand'/Political Corruption, Examples

Readings:

- Chapter 4 from Paul Klebnikov. *Godfather of the Kremlin: Boris Berezovsky and the Looting of Russia*. Harcourt, Inc., 2000
- Patrick Radden Keefe. Buried secrets: How an Israeli billionaire wrested control of one of Africa's biggest prizes. *The New Yorker*, July 8-14, 2013

October 23: 'Grand'/Political Corruption in Democracies and Non-Democracies

Readings:

- Raymond Fisman. Estimating the value of political connections. *The American Economic Review*, 91(4):1095–1102, September 2001
- David Fisman, Ray Fisman, Julia Galef, and Rakesh Khurana. Estimating the value of connections to vice-president Cheney. Working Paper, May 2004
- Gökçe Göktepe and Shanker Satyanath. The economic value of military connections in Turkey. *Public Choice*, forthcoming

October 28: Accountability as a Check on Political Corruption

Readings:

- Jana Kunicová and Susan Rose-Ackerman. Electoral rules and constitutional structures as constraints on corruption. *British Journal of Political Science*, 35.4, April 2005
- Claudio Ferraz and Frederico Finan. Exposing corrupt politicians: The effects of Brazil's publicly released audits on electoral outcomes. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 123(2):703–745, 2008

October 30: The Limits of Accountability

Readings:

- Alicia Adserà, Carles Boix, and Mark Payne. Are you being served? Political accountability and quality of government. *The Journal of Law, Economics & Organization*, 19(2):445–490, 2003
- Macartan Humphreys and Jeremy M. Weinstein. Policing politicians: Citizen empowerment and political accountability in Africa. August 2007
- James R. Hollyer, B. Peter Rosendorff, and James Raymond Vreeland. Measuring transparency. April 2013

November 4: 'Petty' Corruption and Bribery

Readings:

- Chapter 3 in Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel. *Economic Gangsters: Corruption, Violence, and the Poverty of Nations*. Princeton University Press, 2008
- Robert Wade. The system of administrative and political corruption: Canal irrigation in south india. *The Journal of Development Studies*, 18(3):287–328, 1984

November 6: State Capacity and Petty Corruption

Readings:

- Andrei Shleifer and Robert Vishny. Corruption. *The Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 108(3):599–617, August 1993
- Timothy Besley and John McLaren. Taxes and bribery: The role of wage incentives. *The Economic Journal*, 103(416):119–141, January 1993

November 11: A Culture of Corruption

Readings:

- Chapter 4 in Raymond Fisman and Edward Miguel. *Economic Gangsters: Corruption, Violence, and the Poverty of Nations*. Princeton University Press, 2008
- Abigail Barr and Danila Serra. Corruption and culture: An experimental analysis. *Journal of Public Economics*, 94:862–869, 2010

November 13: The Economic Effects of Corruption

Readings:

- Pranab Bardhan. Corruption and development: A review of issues. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 35(3):1320–1346, September 1997
- Martin C. McGuire and Mancur Olson, Jr. The economics of autocracy and majority rule: The invisible hand and the use of force. *Journal of Economic Literature*, 34(1):72–96, March 1996

November 18: The Political Effects of Corruption

Readings:

- Andrew C. Eggers and Jens Hainmueller. Mps for sale? returns to office in postwar british politics. *American Political Science Review*, 103(4):513, November 2009
- Scott Gehlbach, Konstantin Sonin, and Ekaterina Zhuravskaya. Businessman candidates. *American Journal of Political Science*, 54(3):718–736, July 2010

November 20: Anti-Corruption Interventions: Top-Down Strategies

Readings:

- Benjamin A. Olken. Monitoring corruption: Evidence from a field experiment in indonesia. *Journal of Political Economy*, 115(2):200–249, 2007
- James E. Alt and David Dreyer Lassen. Enforcement and public corruption: Evidence from us states. EPRU Working Paper Series, August 2010

November 25: Anti-Corruption Interventions: Bottom-Up Strategies

Readings:

- Ritva Reinikka and Jakob Svensson. The power of information: Evidence from a newspaper campaign to reduce capture. Working Paper: Institute for International Economic Studies, Stockholm University, 2003
- Martina Björkman and Jakob Svensson. Power to the people: Evidence from a randomized field experiment on community-based monitoring in uganda. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 124(2):735–769, May 2009

November 27: Day Before Thanksgiving, No Class

December 2: The Links Between Patronage and Corruption

Readings:

- Keith Darden. The integrity of corrupt states: Graft as an informal state institution. *Politics & Society*, 36(1):35–60, 2008
- James R. Hollyer and Leonard Wantchekon. Corruption in autocracies. May 2012

December 4: Party Systems, Information and Governance

Readings:

- Philip Keefer and Razvan Vlaicu. Democracy, credibility, and clientalism. *Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization*, 24(2):271–406, 2008
- Leonard Wantchekon. Clientalism and voting behavior: Evidence from a field experiment in benin. *World Politics*, 55:399–422, April 2003. Comparative F06
- Leonard Wantchekon. Can informed public deliberation overcome clientalism? experimental evidence from benin. July 2009

December 9: Legalizing Corruption?

Readings:

- Daniel Kaufmann and Pedro C. Vicente. Legal corruption. *Economics & Politics*, 23(2):195–219, July 2011
- Stephen Ansolabehere, John M. de Figueiredo, and James M. Snyder. Why is there so little money in u.s. politics? *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, 17(1):105–130, 2003

December 11: Review Session for Final Papers