

# Data Disclosure, Accountability and the Facets of Transparency<sup>1</sup>

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# Question

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- and how do these map into measures of transparency?

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Relate commonly used measures of transparency to this typology and one another

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So question becomes: What types of info. matter, and when?

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- can't (necessarily) assume she observes anything else



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$p$	the policy chosen
$g(\cdot)$	the relationship btwn. policies and outcomes
$y_j$	others' experiences/well-being
$j \in J \subseteq I \setminus \{i\}$	

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- public is otherwise well-informed

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- relevance depends on distribution of error term  $f(\cdot)$
- i.e., extent to which any one citizen's experiences are representative

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- gov't failures in economic policy – ec. performance subject to many exogenous factors, need for info. aggregation high

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- importance of data collection and disclosure as a facet of transparency

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# HRV Index Inputs

World Development Indicators (Downloaded Dec. 2012)

**Items:** 240 variables from across WDI  
recoded into indicator  $\{0, 1\}$  equal to 1 if non-missing

**Panels:** 125 countries

**Time:** Annual obs., 1980-2010

3875 observations

# HRV Measurement Model

## Item Response Model

240 equations of the form:

$$Pr(y_{j,c,t} = 1 | transparency_{c,t}) = \text{logit}(\delta_j + \beta_j transparency_{c,t})$$

$$j \in \{1, 2, \dots, 240\}$$

$$c \in \{1, 2, \dots, 124\}$$

$$t \in \{1, 2, \dots, 31\}$$

### Priors:

$$\begin{pmatrix} \delta_j \\ \beta_j \end{pmatrix} \sim N\left(\begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 100 & 0 \\ 0 & 100 \end{pmatrix}\right)$$

$transparency_{c,1} \sim N(0, 100)$  recentered at each iteration of MCMC


$$transparency_{c,t} \sim N(transparency_{c,t-1}, \frac{1}{\tau_c}) \quad \forall t > 1$$

Cuba constrained to be negative, Sweden positive

# Correlations in Transparency Indexes


	<b>HRV Index</b>	<b>Freedom House</b>	<b>Newspaper Circ.</b>	<b>FOIL</b>	<b>Media</b>
<b>HRV Index</b>	1.00				
<b>Freedom House</b>	0.62	1.00			
<b>Newspaper Circ.</b>	0.59	0.57	1.00		
<b>FOIL</b>	0.60	0.55	0.51	1.00	
<b>Media</b>	0.68	0.89	0.89	0.60	1.00

# Data Disclosure v. Media Markets





# Data Disclosure v. FOILs




## Assessing Importance to Governance

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{governance}_{c,t} = & \gamma_1 + \gamma_2 \text{governance}_{c,t-1} + \gamma_3 \text{democracy}_{c,t} \\
 & + \gamma_4 \text{transparency}_{c,t} + \gamma_5 \text{democracy}_{c,t} * \text{transparency}_{c,t} \\
 & + \gamma_6 \text{newscirc}_{c,t} + \gamma_7 \text{newscirc}_{c,t} \times \text{democracy}_{c,t} + \gamma_8 \text{GDP}_{c,t} \\
 & + \epsilon_{c,t}
 \end{aligned}$$


$$\gamma \sim N\left( \begin{pmatrix} 0 \\ \vdots \\ 0 \end{pmatrix}, \begin{pmatrix} 1,000 & 0 & \dots & 0 \\ 0 & \ddots & & \vdots \\ \vdots & & \ddots & \vdots \\ 0 & \dots & 0 & 1,000 \end{pmatrix} \right).$$

# Transparency and Bureaucratic Quality



### HRV Scores and Bureaucratic Quality





### News Circulation and Bureaucratic Quality



# Transparency and Law and Order



# Transparency and Corruption



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