

# Transparency, Protest and Political (In)Stability<sup>1</sup>

James R. Hollyer    B. Peter Rosendorff    James Raymond Vreeland

Minnesota

NYU

Georgetown

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<sup>1</sup>Presented as part of the 2013 Annual EPSA Conference, Panel on Regime Authority

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- **Autocratic Instability** – removal of the ruling clique via revolt or democratization
- **Democratic Instability** – replacement of democracy by autocracy
- **Transparency** – the dissemination of credible aggregate economic data

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- transparency improves efficiency of voting mechanism
- elections and unrest substitute mechanisms for leader removal



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$\sigma_s$  will represent the level of transparency

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- 7 Nature chooses  $\epsilon_{i,2} \forall i$ .  $y_{i,2}$  is realized for all citizens and the game ends.

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$$u_{L,t}(G_t, \theta) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } G_t = \theta \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$
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$$R(A) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } A \geq T \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

# Informative Equilibrium

- We focus on an equilibrium with the following characteristics
  - ▶ Pure strategy perfect bayesian
  - ▶ Monotone: incentive to protest is (weakly) falling in the signal.
  - ▶ Each citizen conditions their action on all available information
    - ★  $a_i$  depends on both  $y_i$  and  $s$ .

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
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
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this threshold is a function of  $s$  – denote  $\bar{y}(s)$


# Individual Decision



# Along the Equilibrium Path



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## Threshold for Unrest

Define the value of  $y$  such that  $Pr(\theta = 0|y_{i,1}, s)\beta = \kappa$  as  $\bar{y}^*(s)$ .

- leaves  $i$  indifferent btwn. rebelling and not when rebellion successful iff  $\theta = 0$

Define  $\underline{s}$  by  $T = \Phi\left(\frac{\bar{y}^*(\underline{s}) - g}{\sigma_u}\right)$

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$$\frac{\kappa}{\beta} = Pr(\theta = 0|\bar{y}^*(s), s)$$

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


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





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
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
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


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
$$Pr(\text{remove}|\theta = 0)?$$

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
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


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
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
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
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


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Transparency reduces the frequency of mobilization, stabilizing democracy

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  - ▶ transparency not part of an exchange for civil peace

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
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# Hazard of Autocratic Collapse



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Growth	0.032 [-0.009,0.073]	0.042 [-0.009,0.092]	0.028 [-0.011,0.066]
Transparency <i>times</i> Growth	0.012 [-0.005,0.028]	0.019 [-0.014,0.053]	0.010 [-0.005,0.025]
# of Subjects	143	143	143
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Look at relationship with all forms of instability in Banks dataset

# Mobilization Empirical Model

## Fixed-Effects Negative Binomial Model:

$$\begin{aligned} unrest_{i,t} = & FENegBin(\rho unrest_{i,t-1} + \eta Transparency_{i,t-1} + \zeta Growth_{i,t-1} \\ & + \xi Transparency_{i,t-1} \times Growth_{i,t-1} + \mathbf{X}_{i,t-1}\nu + \mathbf{T}\iota) \end{aligned}$$

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
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
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# Expected Number of Strikes






# Expected Number of Anti-Gov't Demos



# Expected Number of Assassinations



# Democratic Collapse Empirical Model

## Cox Proportional Hazards:

$$h_i(t) = h_0(t) \exp(\gamma \text{Transparency}_{i,t-1} + \delta \text{Growth}_{i,t-1} + \mu \text{Transparency}_{i,t-1} \times \text{Growth}_{i,t-1} + \mathbf{X}_{i,t-1} \beta)$$

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
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# Hazard of Democratic Collapse



# Conclusion

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- consistent with mechanisms that emphasize the role of transparency in the formation of *shared* beliefs about gov't performance

# Autocratic Transition Empirical Model

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# Hazard of Autocratic Transition

