

Transparency, Protest and Political (In)Stability¹

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- **Autocratic Instability** – removal of the ruling clique via revolt or democratization
- **Democratic Instability** – replacement of democracy by autocracy
- **Transparency** – the dissemination of credible aggregate economic data

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- transparency improves efficiency of voting mechanism
- elections and unrest substitute mechanisms for leader removal

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σ_s will represent the level of transparency

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- 7 Nature chooses $\epsilon_{i,2} \forall i$. $y_{i,2}$ is realized for all citizens and the game ends.

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$$u_{L,t}(G_t, \theta) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } G_t = \theta \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$
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$$R(A) = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } A \geq T \\ 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

Informative Equilibrium

- We focus on an equilibrium with the following characteristics
 - ▶ Pure strategy perfect bayesian
 - ▶ Monotone: incentive to protest is (weakly) falling in the signal.
 - ▶ Each citizen conditions their action on all available information
 - ★ a_i depends on both y_i and s .

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
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
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this threshold is a function of s – denote $\bar{y}(s)$


Individual Decision



Along the Equilibrium Path



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Threshold for Unrest

Define the value of y such that $Pr(\theta = 0|y_{i,1}, s)\beta = \kappa$ as $\bar{y}^*(s)$.

- leaves i indifferent btwn. rebelling and not when rebellion successful iff $\theta = 0$

Define \underline{s} by $T = \Phi\left(\frac{\bar{y}^*(\underline{s}) - g}{\sigma_u}\right)$

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$$\frac{\kappa}{\beta} = Pr(\theta = 0|\bar{y}^*(s), s)$$

Leader Retention and the Public Signal

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
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
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
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
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
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


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
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
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
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
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
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
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


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Discrimination:

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Moderating Role of Transparency

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- since mobilization iff bad type survives an election, reduced risk of mobilization

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- attempt to use pattern of results to examine mechanisms, rule out sources of endogeneity

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 - ▶ transparency not part of an exchange for civil peace

Measures

Transparency:	the HRV Index
Autocratic Collapse:	Svolik (2012) regime removal via revolt dem'ization
Democratic Collapse:	the DD dataset (Cheibub et al., 2010)
Unrest:	Banks
Economic Data:	PWT 6.3

Autocratic Collapse Empirical Model

Cox Competing Hazards:

$$h_i(t) = h_0(t) \exp(\gamma \text{Transparency}_{i,t-1} + \delta \text{Growth}_{i,t-1} + \mu \text{Transparency}_{i,t-1} \times \text{Growth}_{i,t-1} + \mathbf{X}_{i,t-1} \beta)$$

Unit: Autocratic Regime-Year

t: Number of Regime Years

Conditional Gap Time Models:

- whether there was a prior replacement of regime
- function of number of prior regime replacements
- control for prior regime replacements (no stratification)

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
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
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Mechanism seems to operate through mass mobilization

- consistent with mechanisms that emphasize the role of transparency in the formation of *shared* beliefs about gov't performance

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	Cond. Past Collapse	Cond. Hist. Instability	Control Past Collapse
Transparency	-0.185** [-0.348,-0.021]	-0.247* [-0.521,0.027]	-0.181** [-0.336,-0.027]
Growth	0.032 [-0.009,0.073]	0.042 [-0.009,0.092]	0.028 [-0.011,0.066]
Transparency <i>times</i> Growth	0.012 [-0.005,0.028]	0.019 [-0.014,0.053]	0.010 [-0.005,0.025]
# of Subjects	143	143	143
# of Failures	18	18	18

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Growth	-0.013 [-0.035,0.009]	-0.016 [-0.046,0.013]	-0.014 [-0.037,0.008]
Transparency \times Growth	0.005 [-0.007,0.017]	0.005 [-0.009,0.020]	0.004 [-0.008,0.017]
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# of Failures	93	93	93

Separating Mobilization and Democratization

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	Cond. Past Collapse	Cond. Hist. Instability	Control Past Collapse
Transparency	0.293 [-0.110,0.696]	0.292 [-0.253,0.837]	0.281 [-0.213,0.775]
Growth	-0.046 [-0.104,0.011]	-0.039 [-0.160,0.082]	-0.050 [-0.111,0.010]
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Transparency	0.155 [-0.043,0.354]	0.148 [-0.072,0.368]	0.160 [-0.040,0.361]
Growth	-0.020* [-0.042,0.002]	-0.037* [-0.075,0.000]	-0.022* [-0.044,0.000]
Transparency × Growth	0.004 [-0.024,0.032]	-0.003 [-0.029,0.023]	0.006 [-0.024,0.035]
# of Subjects	143	143	143
# of Failures	25	25	25

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Look at relationship with all forms of instability in Banks dataset

Mobilization Empirical Model

Fixed-Effects Negative Binomial Model:

$$\begin{aligned} unrest_{i,t} = & FENegBin(\rho unrest_{i,t-1} + \eta Transparency_{i,t-1} + \zeta Growth_{i,t-1} \\ & + \xi Transparency_{i,t-1} \times Growth_{i,t-1} + \mathbf{X}_{i,t-1}\nu + \mathbf{T}\iota) \end{aligned}$$

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
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
$unrest_{i,t}$

- strikes, anti-gov't demos
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- riots?


Expected Number of Strikes



Expected Number of Anti-Gov't Demos



Expected Number of Assassinations



Autocratic Transition Empirical Model

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Conditional Gap Time Models:

Autocratic Transition Empirical Model

Cox Proportional Hazards:

$$h_i(t) = h_0(t) \exp(\gamma \text{Transparency}_{i,t-1} + \delta \text{Growth}_{i,t-1} + \mu \text{Transparency}_{i,t-1} \times \text{Growth}_{i,t-1} + \mathbf{X}_{i,t-1} \beta)$$

Unit: Autocratic-Spell Year

t: Number of Autocratic Years

Conditional Gap Time Models:

- whether there was a prior transition

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Hazard of Autocratic Transition

