

# Parties as Disciplinarians: The Electoral Strategies of Centrist Parties

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- in particular, when are centrist parties clientelistic as opposed to programmatic

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- centrist parties emerge as an interesting case

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- 1 party discipline
- 2 ideology (ideological polarization)

# Mechanisms of Control

① Party discipline

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- ▶ extent to which pol. benefits from (other) party members winning seats
- ▶ tendency to internalize programmatic externalities
- ▶ programmatic politics w/o parties playing an important role

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- but, always doing so (regardless of past electoral strategies) undermines programmatic strategy

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- but, may commit to alt. promotion strategy – Folk Thrm. results

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- in volatile systems: centrist parties clientelist
- in stable systems: centrist parties programmatic (disciplined)



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Typical controls, party unit of observation, 73 countries



## Results (Very Highly Preliminary)

	<b>Personal</b>	<b>Programmatic</b>	<b>Clientelist</b>
Extremist	0.115 [-0.006, .237]	-0.053 [-.124, .017]	-0.011 [-.111, .089]
Volatility	.018 [.010, .026]	-0.12 [-.020, -.004]	.009 [.002, .016]
Extremist × Volatility	-.005 [-.008, -.001]	.004 [.001, .006]	-.002 [-.005, .001]

Volatility ranges (in principal) from 0-100, in practice from 5-70.

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(Very) preliminary empirical support for this claim