Migration, Bureaucratic Reform and Institutional Persistence: Evidence from U.S. Municipalities

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Princeton University

University of Minnesota

October 16, 2014
Question

What are the drivers of civil service reforms to the bureaucracy?
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○ What is the relationship between migration patterns and civil service reforms in US municipalities during the ‘Age of Reform’?
What are the drivers of civil service reforms to the bureaucracy?

Specifically:

- What is the relationship between migration patterns and civil service reforms in US municipalities during the ‘Age of Reform’?
- Did any such relationship have persistent effects on governance outcomes?
Presaging Findings (to date)

No consistent relationship between overall migration levels and civil service adoption

- contra many accounts
Presaging Findings (to date)

No consistent relationship btwn. overall migration levels and civil service adoption

- contra many accounts

The composition of immigrants does seem to matter for reform
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- municipalities that experience high levels of Irish migration ↑ likely to adopt reform

Possible mechanism:
Presaging Findings (to date)

No consistent relationship between overall migration levels and civil service adoption
- contra many accounts

The composition of immigrants does seem to matter for reform
- it's all about the Irish
- municipalities that experience high levels of Irish migration ↑ likely to adopt reform

Possible mechanism: Native response to *threat* of immigrant political muscle
Civil Service Reforms and State Capacity

State capacity as a critical, and poorly understood, contributor to development
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Bureaucratic structure – particularly meritocracy – contributor to capacity
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  - public goods provision (e.g., Rauch, 1995)
Civil Service Reforms and State Capacity

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Bureaucratic structure – particularly meritocracy – contributor to capacity
  - governance outcomes and corruption (e.g., Rauch & Evans, 2000)
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  - economic development (e.g., Besley & Persson, 2010; Evans & Rauch, 1999)
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- governance outcomes and corruption (e.g., Rauch & Evans, 2000)
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Historical US as excellent case to study reforms to bur. structure
Why Migration?

Immigration central to most accounts of patronage in US
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- role of immigrant-focused political machines
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- qualitative accounts (Banfield & Wilson, 1963)
Why Migration?

Immigration central to most accounts of patronage in US

- role of immigrant-focused political machines
- qualitative accounts (Banfield & Wilson, 1963)
- but, few quantitative studies (Ruhil & Camões, 2003, an exception)
Culture and Institutions

Existing work links migration to economic and governance outcomes
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- relevant to development via culture
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Existing work links migration to economic and governance outcomes

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- and corruption via culture
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Migration and long-term econ. development in US (Rodriguez-Pose & von Berlepsch, 2012)
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A institutional mechanism?
Common Account

**Traditional Account: Political machines find their root in immigrant communities**
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Municipalities with large immigrant communities more prone to patronage
Common Account

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- *ethos* of city government (Banfield & Wilson, 1963)
Common Account

Traditional Account: Political machines find their root in immigrant communities

Municipalities with large immigrant communities more prone to patronage
- *ethos* of city government (Banfield & Wilson, 1963)
- clientelism more effective among poor and socially marginalized
But, Reasons for Doubt...

Only quantitative multivariate results to date point to the opposite conclusion.
But, Reasons for Doubt...

Only quantitative multivariate results to date point to the opposite conclusion

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Ignores heterogeneity among migrants:
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Ignores heterogeneity among migrants:

- cultural heterogeneity – ethos-based arguments
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Ignores heterogeneity among migrants:
- cultural heterogeneity – ethos-based arguments
- economic and skills heterogeneity
Methods and Data

Nonetheless, as a first cut, look at the relationship between immigration totals and civil service reform.
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Data Sources:
Methods and Data

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Match counties (IPUMS) with municipalities (Civil Service)
Specification

Fit Cox proportional hazards model to this data

\[ h_c(t) = h_0(t) \exp(X_{c,t}\beta) \]

- \( c \) is county \( c \)
- \( t \) is year \( t \)
- coverage: 1883-1943
- \( h_0(t) \) denotes baseline hazard

Interpolate (linearly) for annual coverage
### Table: Cox Survival Results: Civil Service Reform and Migration Levels

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td>-0.05</td>
<td>-0.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.23]</td>
<td>[0.34]</td>
<td>[0.46]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>-2.24</td>
<td>1.37</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.80]</td>
<td>[1.16]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>-1.88</td>
<td>-3.08</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[1.14]</td>
<td>[1.36]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female Labor</td>
<td>2.10</td>
<td>1.23</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.92]</td>
<td>[1.09]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.07</td>
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<td></td>
<td>[0.02]</td>
<td>[0.03]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Literacy</td>
<td>3.99</td>
<td>5.76</td>
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<tr>
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<td>[1.79]</td>
<td>[2.20]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Porp. Male</td>
<td>-8.97</td>
<td>-4.81</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[1.97]</td>
<td>[2.32]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>-0.07</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.05]</td>
<td>[0.06]</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Fixed Effects</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Disaggregating Immigration

Theoretical accounts seem to call for a more nuanced examination
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Not immigration *per se*, but characteristics of immigrants that matter
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Both of which vary by source country
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(Ancillary benefits for identification)
Cultural Explanations

Immigrants’ preferences and expectations shaped by experiences in source country
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- shapes preferences for clientelistic promises
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- shapes preferences for clientelistic promises
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Imms. from clientelistic source countries likely to promote machines in US
Economic Explanations

Immigrants vary in skills and economic marginalization
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- patronage most effective when aimed at poor
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- or those with limited social mobility
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Imms. from countries with well-developed education systems less likely to promote machines
### Region of Origin and Reform

**Table:** Cox Survival Results: Civil Service Reform and Migration by Source Region

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Coefficient</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Northern Eur.</td>
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<td>0.82</td>
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<td>Western Eur.</td>
<td>5.45</td>
<td>3.07</td>
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<tr>
<td>Southern Eur.</td>
<td>-1.61</td>
<td>1.71</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cent/East Eur.</td>
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<td>0.70</td>
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<tr>
<td>Asia</td>
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<td>7.67</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cent./South Am.</td>
<td>0.41</td>
<td>2.13</td>
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<tr>
<td>Black</td>
<td>1.62</td>
<td>1.22</td>
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<tr>
<td>Literacy</td>
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<td>Literacy^2</td>
<td>499.57</td>
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<tr>
<td>Literacy^3</td>
<td>-209.09</td>
<td>137.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture</td>
<td>-1.24</td>
<td>1.40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Porp. Male</td>
<td>-5.81</td>
<td>2.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Labor</td>
<td>25.10</td>
<td>23.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Labor^2</td>
<td>-107.20</td>
<td>142.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female Labor^3</td>
<td>186.38</td>
<td>354.32</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female Labor^4</td>
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<td>308.87</td>
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<td>Population</td>
<td>-0.02</td>
<td>0.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>State Fixed Effects</td>
<td>✓</td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
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Surprising Results from Disaggregation

In preparation to examine source country characteristics, looked at bivariate relationship between reform and immigration from prominent sources

- mostly imprecisely estimated (and small) effects
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Flies in face of cultural and skill-based explanations
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and traditional accounts
## Irish Immigration and Reform

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable Name</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
<th>Model 4</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrant</td>
<td>-0.65</td>
<td>-1.45</td>
<td>-1.45</td>
<td>-0.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.29]</td>
<td>[0.39]</td>
<td>[0.39]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Irish</td>
<td>11.98</td>
<td>11.61</td>
<td>11.64</td>
<td>13.65</td>
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<tr>
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<td></td>
<td>[0.87]</td>
<td>[1.06]</td>
<td>[1.05]</td>
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<td>Agric.</td>
<td>0.22</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>-1.57</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[1.09]</td>
<td>[1.09]</td>
<td>[1.33]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Female Labor</td>
<td>2.01</td>
<td>1.98</td>
<td>1.90</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[1.02]</td>
<td>[1.02]</td>
<td>[1.15]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Age</td>
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<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.05</td>
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<td>[0.02]</td>
<td>[0.03]</td>
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<tr>
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<td>6.01</td>
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<td>[1.84]</td>
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<tr>
<td>Population</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>0.03</td>
<td>-0.09</td>
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<td></td>
<td>[0.05]</td>
<td>[0.05]</td>
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<td>South</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>[0.25]</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</table>

State Fixed Effects: ✓
Further Controls

We additionally run these models controlling for electoral competitiveness.
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- established mechanism in the lit.
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- established mechanism in the lit.
- provides a comparison for effect sizes
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Why the Irish?

Given the prevalence of Irish political machines it seems unlikely that assoc. reflects immigrant demands

Native reaction to immigrant threat?
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Irish imm. as particularly threatening:
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Native reaction to immigrant threat?

Irish imm. as particularly threatening:
- large overall numbers and sometimes highly concentrated
- or something particular to native reaction to Irish?
Immigrant Threat Mechanism

Civil service as a way to ‘lock in’ native dominance of gov’t positions

- qualifications favor natives
- existing appointees covered in
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Useful whenever faced by a ethnically cohesive imm. community
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A First Cut at the Threat Mechanism

Table: The Effect of Fractionalization and Polarization

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Model 1</th>
<th>Model 2</th>
<th>Model 3</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>% Immigrants</td>
<td>3.32***</td>
<td>2.14*</td>
<td>0.46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.10)</td>
<td>(1.18)</td>
<td>(1.40)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Immigrant Fractionalization</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>-0.99**</td>
<td>-0.64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(0.42)</td>
<td>(0.47)</td>
<td>(0.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>% Immigrants * Imm. Frac.</td>
<td>-3.36**</td>
<td>-3.27**</td>
<td>-0.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(1.40)</td>
<td>(1.51)</td>
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<tr>
<td>State FE</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cubic time polynomial</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
<td>✓</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Logistic regression coefficients with robust standard errors clustered by city in parentheses. *$p < 0.05$, **$p < 0.01$, two-tailed tests.
Further Steps 1: Mechanisms

The first of our next steps should focus on teasing out this mechanism:
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1. How to measure the immigrant threat?
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The first of our next steps should focus on teasing out this mechanism:

1. How to measure the immigrant threat?
   a. not sure that the polarization/fractionalization measures are satisfying

2. Or is it an Irish (rather than immigrant) threat?
   a. a statistical horse race btwn. Irish imm. and concentrated imm. of any source?
   b. why would Irish imm. differ from other source countries?
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The first of our next steps should focus on teasing out this mechanism:

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   - mechanism suggests non-linearities in Irish effect. are these there?

2. Or is it an Irish (rather than immigrant) threat?
   - a statistical horse race btwn. Irish imm. and concentrated imm. of any source?
Further Steps 1: Mechanisms

The first of our next steps should focus on teasing out this mechanism:

1. How to measure the immigrant threat?
   - a. not sure that the polarization/fractionalization measures are satisfying
   - b. mechanism suggests non-linearities in Irish effect. are these there?

2. Or is it an Irish (rather than immigrant) threat?
   - a. a statistical horse race btwn. Irish imm. and concentrated imm. of any source?
   - b. why would Irish imm. differ from other source countries?
Further Steps 2: Persistence

We’ve yet to address the second part of our title
Further Steps 2: Persistence

We’ve yet to address the second part of our title

1. Do civil service reforms have persistence effects on governance a century or more later?
Further Steps 2: Persistence

We’ve yet to address the second part of our title

1. Do civil service reforms have persistence effects on governance a century or more later?

2. What governance outcomes would make sense to look at?