

Migration, Bureaucratic Reform and Institutional Persistence: Evidence from US Municipalities¹

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- how did patterns of immigration affect the adoption of civil service boards in US municipalities during the 'Age of Reform'?
- did any institutional changes resulting from migration have persistent effects on governance outcomes through the present day?

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Consistent with cultural and human capital prerequisites for meritocracy

Why Immigration?

Historical linkages:

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Academic Debate

- 'ethos' of city gov't

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Large – and heterogenous across municipalities – shifts in many factors identified elsewhere as critical to meritocratic reform

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Immigration as a lens through which to examine competing hypotheses about the determinants of meritocracy

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- 4 the Polarization/Conflict Mechanism

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- repeated games, multiple equilibria

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Difficult to establish patronage system among immigrant groups where these norms and expectations are lacking, or norm of gov't impartiality widely adopted

The Cultural Hypothesis

Hypothesis 1: An influx of immigrants from countries with a history of patronage politics will reduce the hazard of merit reform. An influx of immigrants from countries with a history of meritocracy will have the reverse effect.

Human Capital and Meritocracy

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Influx of immigrants may shift ave. ed. levels up or down, depending on their ed. background

The Human Capital Hypothesis

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Hypothesis 2: Immigration from countries with extensive education systems will increase the hazard of merit reform. Immigration from countries lacking such systems will inhibit reform.

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- widened skill premium as a result of immigration induced diversity

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- patronage mechanisms thrive by manipulating scarcity
- value of gov't jobs/transfers highest to those with low incomes – diminishing marginal returns

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- or political services demanded for patronage posts declines → declining value of patronage

The Diversity/Economic Hypothesis

Hypothesis 3: Immigration affects patronage insofar as it increases/reduces the ethnic diversity (fractionalization) of destination municipalities. Higher fractionalization is associated with a greater hazard of reform.

Polarization and Merit

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- possibility of rotation in power
- attempt to prevent undesirable policies by opposition in the future (Besley & Persson, 2010; Acemoglu et al, 2011)

The Polarization/Conflict Hypothesis

Hypothesis 4: Immigration affects patronage insofar as it increases/reduces the degree of ethnic polarization of destination municipalities. Higher polarization is associated with a reduced hazard of reform.

Summary of Four Hypotheses

Four hypotheses with regards to migration and reform

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- 4 ↓ in the level of ethnic polarization – the Polarization/Conflict Hypothesis

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**Demographic
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Demographic Measures: Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS)

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- Polarization:** $1 - \sum_{g=1}^N \left(\frac{0.5 - \pi_{g,c,t}}{0.5}\right)^2 \pi_{g,c,t}$

Empirical Model

Cox proportional hazards regression:

$$h_c(t) = h_0(t) \exp(\mathbf{X}_{c,t} \beta)$$

- c denotes county/municipality c
- t denotes year t
- years: 1883-1943
- $h_0(t)$ denotes the baseline hazard rate

Data are linearly interpolated to allow for annual coverage

Adjustments for violations of PH assumption according to Box-Steffensmeier & Jones (2004) and Keele (2010)

Raw Migration Levels and Reform

Table: Cox Survival Results: Civil Service Reform and Migration Levels

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Migrant	0.55 [0.23]	-0.05 [0.34]	-0.10 [0.46]
Black		-2.24 [0.80]	1.37 [1.16]
Agriculture		-1.88 [1.14]	-3.08 [1.36]
Female Labor		2.10 [0.92]	1.23 [1.09]
Age		0.04 [0.02]	0.07 [0.03]
Literacy		3.99 [1.79]	5.76 [2.20]
Pop. Male		-8.97 [1.97]	-4.81 [2.32]
Population		-0.07 [0.05]	-0.09 [0.06]
State Fixed Effects			✓

Source Countries and Reform

Table: Cox Survival Results: Civil Service Reform and Migration by Source Region

Variable Name	Coefficient	Standard Error
Northern Eur.	1.81	0.82
Western Eur.	5.45	3.07
Southern Eur.	-1.61	1.71
Cent./East Eur.	-2.00	0.70
Asia	-4.43	7.67
Cent./South Am.	0.41	2.13
Black	1.62	1.22
Literacy	-379.04	313.61
Literacy ²	499.57	360.07
Literacy ³	-209.09	137.46
Agriculture	-1.24	1.40
Pop. Male	-5.81	2.34
Female Labor	25.10	23.73
Female Labor ²	-107.20	142.34
Female Labor ³	186.38	354.32
Female Labor ⁴	-99.04	308.87
Population	-0.02	0.07
State Fixed Effects	✓	

Source Countries and Reform: Context

A one standard deviation increase in:

- the level of northern European immigration is associated with a roughly 20 percent increase in the hazard of reform
- the level of western European immigration is associated with a roughly 9 percent increase in the hazard of reform
- the level of central/eastern European immigration is associated with a roughly 20 percent decline in the hazard of reform

Northern and Western European countries as having long histories of meritocracy and widespread ed.

- consistent w/ both Hypotheses 1 and 2

Fractionalization, Polarization and Reform

Table: Cox Survival Results: Civil Service Reform, Ethnic Fractionalization and Ethnic Polarization

Variable Name	Coefficient	Standard Error
Polarization	0.26	0.48
Fractionalization	-0.61	0.44
Literacy	4.12	2.09
Age	0.06	0.03
Female Labor	5.36	4.09
Female Labor ²	-8.45	8.61
Pop. Male	-4.35	2.33
Agriculture	-3.06	1.38
Population	-0.05	0.07
State Fixed Effects	✓	

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- have limited coverage of data on meritocracy in Europe (Hollyer, 2011)

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- looking for measures related to capacity rather than just corruption

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Currently looking for data – constrained by early dates and high level of disaggregation

Conclusion

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- in particular, where migrants originate appears to matter for reform
- neither total level of migration nor ethnic fractionalization or polarization appear to matter much

Consistent with cultural and human capital-based explanations for reform