

Migration, Machines and Reform

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Setting: US municipalities around turn of 20th Century (1883-1943)

Theoretical Motivation

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Predictions are static. How do these hold up in a dynamic setting with changes in social composition?

Empirical Motivation

Two Major Transformations in Turn-of-the-Century US:

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- **Era of Mass Migration**

- **'Age of Reform'**

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- particularly German immigrants

Empirical Motivation II

Table: *Bivariate Associations: Country of Origin and Civil Service Reform*

Country	Coefficient
Ireland	11.5 (1.67)
Italy	-0.51 (1.78)
Canada	-1.26 (2.39)
Norway	-0.68 (2.21)
UK	-6.43 (2.54)
Germany	-1.78 (0.92)
Poland	-5.58 (1.71)

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- ▶ unlikely material threat – not amenable to transfers
- ▶ machines as potential bulwark against leftism

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Paradoxical Result:

- where machines survive, they tend to serve non-ideological migrant populations
- but, rapid increases in these populations induce anti-machine reform

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Two period probabilistic voting model

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Simple majority rule

Assumptions About Native Groups

Two Assumptions:

$$\textcircled{1} \quad \frac{u'(\omega_P)}{u'(\omega_R)} > \frac{f_R(0)}{f_P(0)}$$

$$\textcircled{2} \quad N_P > N_R$$

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Two Assumptions:

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 - ▶ parties target transfers at poor rather than rich
- 2 $N_P > N_R$
 - ▶ poor more numerous than rich

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▶ will parties target transfers at migrants above native poor?

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▶ size of migrant influx

Non-Ideological Migrants

Proposition

If $\frac{u'(\omega_M)}{u'(\omega_P)} > \frac{f_P(0)}{f_M(0)}$, there exists a value of N_M , which we denote \bar{N}_M such that, for all $N_M \geq \bar{N}_M$ all parties' equilibrium reform position is $r^ = 1$. For $N_M < \bar{N}_M$, all parties' equilibrium reform position is $r^* = 0$.*

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- for a sufficiently large influx, transfers to native poor in $t = 2$ drop to zero
- poor support reform in $t = 1$

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- if poor receive positive transfers in $t = 2$, they never support reform in $t = 1$

Data Sources

Data Sources:

- Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS)
 - ▶ change in migrant pop. (specific groups) as pct. of total pop.
 - ▶ control for 10 year lag in migrant pop as pct of total
 - ▶ Irish and African-American as non-ideological, German and Italian as ideological
 - ▶ series of controls (% Agriculture, Female Labor Ratio, Age, Literacy, Pop. totals, Migrant pop in levels)
 - ▶ linear imputations for annual data
- Civil Service Assembly of the United States and Canada (1937, 1940, 1943)
 - ▶ binary {0, 1} indicator of presence of civil service board
 - ▶ know year of adoption
- Electoral Competitiveness: Pres. Election Returns (by county) (ICPSR)

Match counties (IPUMS, Election Returns) with municipalities (Civil Service)

Empirical Model

Multiple record survival data: Outcome hazard of reform in a given year.

$$\text{Reform}_{i,t} = \text{logit}^{-1}(\gamma \text{ Change Migrant}_{i,t} + \mathbf{X}_{i,t}\beta)$$

- cubic time polynomials for duration dependence
- standard errors clustered by municipality
- exclude extreme outliers (top 5% by inflows)

Results

Table: *The Effect of Immigrant Rate of Change*

	African-American	Irish	German	Italian	Total Imm.
Δ Migrant	0.082* (0.047)	0.262** (0.123)	0.037 (0.051)	0.052 (0.061)	-0.005 (0.013)
Migrant _{t-10}	-0.861 (1.116)	17.222*** (4.373)	0.037 (0.051)	0.890 (3.744)	-0.099 (0.322)
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 - ② general view of institutions as commitment device for politicians