

# Was Meritocracy Inspired by a Nativist Backlash Against Immigration? Migration and the Civil Service During the US 'Age of Reform'

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- preempt this through institutional barriers – including civil service

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- model also advances predictions w. regard to public goods provision/heterogenous treatment effects – tests in progress

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- but, controversial: 4 votes on literacy test from 1897-1917, passes via veto override. Naturalization Act in 1906

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- erect institutional barriers to this

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  - ▶ and so also support reform

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Absent *change* no commitment problem exists – current beneficiaries of clientelism (presumably a majority) oppose reform

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- 3 But, migrant influxes more positive after reform (positive interaction effect)

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- 1 where democratic institutions are robust
- 2 gov'ts cannot directly inhibit migration flows
- 3 (or disenfranchise new migrants, see point 1)
- 4 and changes are sufficiently large

# Data

## Data Sources:

- Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS)
  - ▶ pct. change in migrant pop. btwn. decennial censuses
  - ▶ series of controls (% Black, % Agriculture, Female Labor Ratio, Age, Literacy, Pop. totals, Migrant pop in levels)
  - ▶ linear imputations for annual data
- Civil Service Assembly of the United States and Canada (1937, 1940, 1943)
  - ▶ binary  $\{0, 1\}$  indicator of presence of civil service board
  - ▶ know year of adoption
- Electoral Competitiveness: Pres. Election Returns (by county) (ICPSR)

Match counties (IPUMS, Election Returns) with municipalities (Civil Service)

# Empirical Model

Multiple record survival data: Outcome hazard of reform in a given year.

$$\text{Reform}_{i,t} = \text{logit}^{-1}(\gamma \text{ Pct. Change Migrant}_{i,t} + \mathbf{X}_{i,t}\beta)$$

- cubic time polynomials for duration dependence
- standard errors clustered by municipality
- exclude extreme outliers (top 1% by inflows – up to 5,000%)


# Results

Table: The Effect of Immigrant Rate of Change

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
Migrant Change	0.005*** (0.001)	0.006*** (0.001)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.007*** (0.002)	0.008*** (0.002)	0.005** (0.002)
Migrant %		0.409 (0.255)	-0.505 (0.336)	-0.501 (0.335)	-0.341 (0.350)	-0.198 (0.441)
<b>Dem. Controls &amp; Competition</b>			✓	✓	✓	✓
<b>South Dummy</b>				✓		
<b>South Dropped</b>					✓	
<b>State FEs</b>						✓
<b>Cubic Time</b>						
<b>Polynomial</b>	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓	✓

# Ethnic Threat v. Electoral Competition

Figure: Immigrant vs. Electoral Threats: Marginal Effects





# Not Culture

Table: Bivariate Associations: Country of Origin and Civil Service Reform

Country	Coefficient
Ireland	11.5 (1.67)
Italy	-0.51 (1.78)
Canada	-1.26 (2.39)
Norway	-0.68 (2.21)
UK	-6.43 (2.54)
Germany	-1.78 (0.92)
Poland	-5.58 (1.71)

# Not Reverse Causation

Table: The Effect of Immigrant Rate of Change

Variable	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Migrant Change (Future)	-0.016 (0.015)	-0.015 (0.011)	-0.037** (0.015)	-0.047* (0.024)
% Migrant		-0.317 (2.367)	-9.034** (3.818)	-2.229 (6.342)
<b>Dem. Controls &amp; Competition</b>			✓	✓
<b>State FEs</b>				✓
<b>Cubic Time Polynomial</b>	✓	✓	✓	✓

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**To be completed:** Public goods analysis