

Parties as Disciplinarians: Clientelism, Corruption and the Industrial Organization of Parties

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- what patterns should this produce in the corrupt behavior of politicians within a given party?
- how do the various mechanisms of party control interact with one another?

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Two mechanisms of party control:

- ① *party discipline*
 - ▶ manipulation of career concerns, party endorsements
- ② *ideology*
 - ▶ politicians' primitive preference for advancing party's programmatic line

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- 2 *Discipline* redresses this problem among junior pols., but not senior
- 3 *Ideology* redresses this problem among senior pols., but may undermine use of discipline against junior
- 4 Discipline more likely to emerge when value of senior posts to party low, when politicians homogeneous, and ideology weak

Clientelism, Corruption and Elections

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- Keefer & Vlaicu, 2008; Klačnja & Titiunik, 2015

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Parties have a stronger incentive to advance programmatic line – party discipline as a mechanism for binding pols. to programmatic policies

Framework Primitives

Actors:	Party Senior Pols. Junior Pols.
Actions:	Party chooses junior pols for promotion Pols choose effort levels { <i>programmatic</i> , <i>clientelist</i> }
Prog. Production:	joint by all pols
Type Space:	Pols vary in valence { <i>high</i> , <i>low</i> }
Utilities:	Party: Candidate Valence + (weighted) Social Welfare Pols: Joint programmatic prod. + own clientelist prod.

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- career concerns only operative for subset of junior pols

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- rising in degree of junior pol heterogeneity
- and in value of higher office to party (since all senior pols shirk on programmatic effort)

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- think Fearon (1999) as applied to internal party politics

Predictions: Behavior of Politicians

Table: Politician Behavior

		Ideological Intensity	
		Low	High
Discipline	Low	Senior: High Clientelism/Corruption	Senior: Low Clientelism/Corruption
		Junior: High Clientelism/Corruption	Junior: Intermediate Clientelism/Corruption
	High	Senior: High Clientelism/Corruption	Senior: Low Clientelism/Corruption
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Extensive dataset on career trajectories of Brazilian mayors (Klašnja & Titiunik, 2015)

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- 2 would like data on senior pols as well

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- cross-nationally?
- if so, how to code parties as disciplined/not?